De la libertad en el Estado a la libertad del Estado: Hobbes entre el liberalismo y el republicanismo

Resumen

Este trabajo tematiza la concepción hobbesiana de la libertad desde un ángulo que trasciende al paradigma mecanicista de la libertad negativa y expone su compatibilidad con una magnitud prima facie antagónica: la obediencia política. Para ello, el texto ofrece un balance del tratamiento que Thomas Hobbes da al concepto de libertad en el Leviatán mediante su contraste con las tipologías formuladas por Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin y Quentin Skinner, referentes que comparten una fijación por el concepto de libertad y una antipatía por la propuesta hobbesiana. El itinerario de trabajo comprende tres momentos: (I) evidenciar la filiación liberal con que Hobbes aborda el concepto negativo de libertad, (II) informar la cercanía entre la autodeterminación individual y estatal en el Leviatán y los rudimentos republicanos del concepto positivo de libertad, y (III) reseñar la contribución hobbesiana al paradigma moderno de la moral prudencial como articulador entre versiones adversas de la libertad.

Abstract

This paper deals with the Hobbesian conception of liberty from a perspective that transcends the mechanistic paradigm of negative liberty and exposes its compatibility with a prima facie opposite magnitude: political obedience. To this end, the text presents a balance of Thomas Hobbes treatment of the concept of liberty in the Leviathan by contrasting it with the typologies formulated by Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin and Quentin Skinner, authors who share an attraction for the concept of liberty and an aversion for the Hobbesian proposal. The work plan is integrated by three moments: (I) to expose the liberal affiliation with which Hobbes approaches the negative concept of liberty, (II) to report the closeness between individual and state self-determination in the Leviathan and the republican foundations of the positive concept of liberty, and (III) to outline the Hobbesian contribution to the modern paradigm of prudential morality as an articulator between contrary versions of liberty.this work, first of all, I focus on historically outlining some aspects of how Hobbes receives the problem of political power; Secondly, I clarify what the theory of indirect power defended by Bellarmine consists of; in third place; I analyze the arguments by which Hobbes intends to object to the cardinal; Fourthly, I point out how the problem of indirect power is updated in the contemporary world; Finally, I conclude on the limitation of the concept of state sovereignty.